Israel's dilemma

Israel is stuck between a rock and a hard place.

Despite talk of disarming Hezbollah and rescuing hostages, the current Israeli campaign in Lebanon is about one thing: reestablishing the Israeli military deterrent in the new Middle East. In this context, the new Middle East is not some neo-conservative fantasy land of shining democracy, but rather one in which the geopolitical power of Iran is on the ascendancy. Both historic checks on Iranian ambition, Iraq and to a lesser extent Afghanistan, have been plunged into chaos by the criminal mismanagement of the Bush administration. With the United States military stuck in the sands of Iraq and Afghanistan, the Iranians are seizing what to them must seem like a golden opportunity to develop a nuclear weapon. This capacity will not only cement Tehran's regional supremacy over Baghdad and Kabul, but also over Riyadh. Furthermore, it will build a shield of deterrence against Israeli aggression behind which Iran, with Russian weapons and expertise, can more freely build an army to rival that of Israel.

Such an army under the control of the Iran's ruling Ayatollahs would most certainly pose a threat to the existence of Israel and it is precisely for this reason, and this reason alone, that the Israelis feel compelled to hit Lebanon so hard. Ultimately, Israel needs the explosions of its bombs in Beirut to echo in the streets of Tehran.

This is not to say that the Iranians did not understand what Israel's reaction would be when their proxies in Lebanon abducted two Israeli soldiers on July 12th. Indeed, Iran has proved to be an extremely astute actor in the international arena. From their contacts with former Bush administration ally Ahmad Chalabi, to their fortification of Hezbollah under the nose of Israel and the international community, Iran has shown time and again how well they play the game of international maneuvering. Indeed, Iran took a gamble by authorizing the attack on Israel by Hezbollah the day European leaders began talking of sanctions against Iran regarding its nuclear program. From where we stand today, it would seem that gamble is paying off.

Iran figured that by attacking Israel one of three outcomes was possible. Either the Israelis would fail to respond militarily. This would have been interpreted in the Middle East as a sign of weakness and would have strengthened the position of Iran in the region. Or the Israelis would attack Lebanon which would produce one of two outcomes. Either Israel would be successful in their campaign, i.e. they would quickly subdue Hezbollah, and do so without inflicting large numbers of civilian casualties. Or they would fail, militarily, or politically, or both. The consequence of such a failure on the part of Israel would also be to strengthen Iran's hand in the region.

Unfortunately, it would seems Israel has played largely into Iran's hands, perhaps even more so than the Iranians had ever hoped for. Israel's foolish decision to rely on air power early in the campaign, a decision which provoked a high number of civilian deaths, quickly lead to international condemnation of Israel and a loss of public sympathy for their cause. The United States, weakened politically by the fiasco in Iraq, could only buy Israel so much time at the Security Council, before bending to international pressure supportive of an unconditional cessation of hostilities. Secondly, Israel underestimated Hezbollah as an enemy militarily and now, four weeks into the war, Hezbollah continues to escalate the daily number of rocket attacks on Israel. And though Israel's ability to dominate Hezbollah was never in question, it would now appear that Israel's invinciblity is. This, alone, constitutes a military defeat for Israel.

So this is the rock, appearing weak in the Muslim world, and the hard spot, appearing nefarious in the Muslim world and beyond, between which Israel now finds itself stuck. Ultimately, Israel is in this position because of the failure to construct a viable and peaceful Palestinian state. Once this key issue is resolved, moderates in places like Lebanon will gain the upper hand and states like Iran will find it more difficult to exploit their smaller neighbors in wanton wars by proxy.